

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.237
3 February 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Lord CHALFONT

(United Kingdom)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. C. LUKANOV Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. D. POPOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS Mr. S. F. RAE Mr. C. J. MARSHALL Mr. P. D. LEE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. Z. CERNIK Mr. V. VAJNAR Mr. R. KLEIN
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. A. ABERRA Mr. A. ZELLEKE
<u>India:</u>	Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI Mr. K. P. LUKOSE Mr. K. P. JAIN
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI Mr. S. AVETTA Mr. F. SORO
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. G. O. IJEWERE Mr. L. C. N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mrs. H. SKOWRONSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALIL
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir H. BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURLIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD
Mr. G. BUNN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELL

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the two hundred and thirty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I shall now, with the Committee's permission, make a statement as the representative of the United Kingdom.

My contribution to this opening general debate in which we are now engaged will be a short one. I had indeed considered the possibility of not taking part in the general debate at all, because the views of my Government on the main issues of arms control and disarmament are, I am sure, well known to you all.

I was most interested to see the Press reports this morning of the message to the Committee from Mr. Kosygin (ENDC/167) and I await with even greater interest the contribution of the representative of the Soviet Union later this morning.

I believe that the important thing we must do now is to get down to detailed, serious and intensive negotiation on some of the specific issues that we have to deal with. I should therefore like to take a few minutes to identify what my delegation believes to be some of these principal issues.

All the subjects that we discuss here are important; and if we isolate one or two from the rest it is because they are especially urgent or because they offer better chances of agreement. By both these criteria the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons must obviously be at the very top of our agenda.

As you may remember, in the message which I brought to you from my Prime Minister on 27 January and which has been circulated to members of the Committee (ENDC/166), he pointed out that the working-out of an agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons was the most pressing need in the disarmament field. President Johnson, in his message (ENDC/165) to the Committee on the same day, also put the need to sign a non-proliferation treaty at the head of his seven points. And I found it encouraging that the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, should have concluded his speech with the statement that --

"The Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the Committee should during its present session consider in the most detailed manner the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and should apply itself to working out a definite agreement upon this question. With that as a starting point, we propose that the Committee should examine and agree, article by article,

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a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would close all paths to the proliferation of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly, in any form. The Soviet delegation is fully prepared for this work."

(ENDC/PV.235, p.20)

Those are good signs, and I hope they will lead without delay into detailed and businesslike discussion.

I think there may still be at times a tendency among some of us to see non-proliferation as no more than a recital of negatives -- simply as a series of prohibitions directed at the non-nuclear States. For different reasons -- some of them valid, some less so -- these prohibitions are not readily accepted by everyone. In the nature of things the obligations of a non-proliferation treaty must appear to fall unequally on non-nuclear and on nuclear States; and one of our tasks must be to find ways to reduce this apparent discrimination. We make a very grave mistake if we look upon non-proliferation as merely a recital of "You must not do this" and "You must not do that".

The prevention of proliferation is first and foremost a positive challenge, and it promises positive rewards. I do not pretend that arms-control agreements like these do not involve a degree of risk. I might, just as an example, point to the reduction of nuclear armouries by the principal nuclear Powers, which most people believe should go hand-in-hand with non-proliferation. I believe we should realize that such a reduction of nuclear weapons, desirable as it may be, might involve a reduction of the capacity of these countries to guarantee the safety of non-nuclear countries against attack or the threat of attack from a third nuclear Power. In Europe too there are risks, risks which affect all -- and I repeat: all -- the interested parties involved in the present East-West confrontation. But none of these risks is as great as it seems, and if we are not prepared to take these risks we shall achieve nothing.

Consider what we should gain from a treaty of non-proliferation. Instead of seeing the present balance of nuclear power, which is certainly temporary and possibly even illusory, gradually decline into a state of what I have before now called nuclear anarchy, we should be stepping firmly away from the obsolete attitudes of the cold war and away from the sterility of armed confrontation. Brandishing nuclear weapons at one another is unlikely to lead to mutual understanding, whether they are brandished in Europe or in Africa or in Asia. There can

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surely be no country that would not breathe more easily if arms control agreements were to allow it to divert its expenditure on nuclear weapons to more constructive purposes.

And we must not fall into the trap of thinking that these agreements must necessarily await the resolution of all the world's political differences. In this connexion I was impressed at our first meeting by the words of Ambassador Khallaf about the causal links between disarmament discussions and world peace. He said:

"At one time an improvement in the international situation was considered to be a condition sine qua non for disarmament negotiations, an attitude which unnecessarily blocked all discussion of disarmament while stocks and improvements of nuclear weapons advanced inexorably. Moreover, the deterioration of the international situation was an easy excuse either to suspend debates already in progress or to defer until later the conclusion of an agreement which could otherwise have been concluded at once. This in no way helped to improve an international situation which was already dangerously tense.

"Now, on the contrary, we observe -- or at least we hope for -- a sounder perception of the relation between discussions on disarmament and the international situation. An improvement in the latter has become, as it should be, a parallel goal which must be pursued in order that progress may be made along the path to disarmament, while at the same time agreements on certain aspects of disarmament are sought to relax international tension and to prevent it from leading to a world conflagration. Thus no means and no opportunity of ensuring world peace will be neglected." (ibid., p.37)

Of course, Ambassador Khallaf is right: disarmament can make a positive contribution to the solution of political problems and can do much to shape the future structure of international relations. Indeed the partial test-ban treaty of 1963 (ENDC/10C/Rev.1) has already shown this to be so.

I now turn to a subject which has a close bearing on non-proliferation -- that of a comprehensive test ban. I have already sent to the members of this Committee a report on "The Detection and Recognition of Underground Explosions", published by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. It records

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United Kingdom work on the development of seismic techniques since the Conference of Experts in 1958. I think my colleagues will agree that the report underlines the interest and effort which have been devoted to this question in the United Kingdom, and I very much hope that this research will contribute to our joint study of the problem.

Members of the Committee will have noticed in the conclusion to the report these significant words -- which are the very last words in the report:

"Therefore there is, and always will be, an uncertainty about the ability to detect and identify an individual low-magnitude event at a particular place and time".

In the light of this considered advice from some of our most distinguished scientists, I need hardly say that my Government fully endorses the need for effective verification of any comprehensive test ban. As you know, the resolution on the subject adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December drew attention to "the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection ...". (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161)

We must neglect no opportunity of exploring ways of reducing the gap between the present positions of the Soviet Union and the West. I think that we should, in particular, devote careful study to some of the suggestions made by the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. For example, the creation of an international detection club, as proposed by the Swedish delegation (ENDC/154), would be a development of existing arrangements which my Government would welcome. We believe that it would give a valuable impetus to seismic research in non-nuclear countries, although we fully realize that the establishment of a world-wide array system is bound to take time and money.

There is also what might be called the theory of inspection by challenge. This idea was, for instance, reflected in a speech to the First Committee of the General Assembly by the Swedish permanent representative to the United Nations, who said:

"We might well consider the fact that the ultimate sanction against a breach of an agreement of this kind is a retreat from the agreement by the party that considers its supreme national interest to be endangered.

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Indeed, if a State party to the treaty were to suspect an unidentified event to be an underground nuclear test, and if a request for clarification and verification were rejected or answered in a manner which international scientific opinion found unsatisfactory, that might constitute a right for the party concerned to reconsider its further participation in the agreement." (A/C.1/PV.1385, p.6)

I need not point out that under some such arrangement as this the accused and the accuser would be under an equal obligation to explain. Withdrawal from a treaty is not a move that can be lightly undertaken. It is, however, already provided for in article IV of the partial test-ban Treaty. I do not wish to isolate either of these ideas for special discussion, but I mention them to underline my view that we should examine every possible means of verification that might lead to an effectively-policed comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I hope I shall not have given the impression that my Government is interested only in agreements on non-proliferation and a comprehensive test ban. This is most certainly not the case. We have a lively interest in all proposals for arms control and disarmament, whether they are new or old and wherever they may originate. A number of important proposals have already been put forward -- for example, President Johnson's proposal outlined in his message to our Committee of 21 January 1964 (ENDC/120) for a verified freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles and subsequent reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. The details of the freeze have already been fully elaborated in this Committee, and this proposal does, I suggest, show a readiness on the part of a nuclear Power to submit to self-denying ordinances of its own. Reduction of these nuclear delivery vehicles would obviously be a positive measure of disarmament. If one examines proposals of this sort, it seems clear that the idea of a small number of nuclear Powers clinging desperately to their nuclear arsenals while denying nuclear weapons to everyone else is, to say the least, an oversimplification.

Another proposal recalled by Mr. Foster at the opening meeting of this session -- and this also helps to put things in their proper perspective -- is the United States proposal (ibid.) for an end to the production of

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fissionable material coupled with the transfer to peaceful purposes of large quantities of such material; a process that would involve the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons.

There are other paths as well which we can explore in the search for a peaceful world. We have much sympathy for the efforts of the countries of Africa and Latin America to establish nuclear-free zones, and we shall give their studies and their recommendations careful consideration. Elsewhere in the world -- for example, in Central Europe -- patterns of alliance or political alignment may make it difficult to seek security along those particular lines. This may, in fact, be one of the few areas in which arms control and disarmament cannot be considered in isolation from political solutions.

Some of the same arguments might apply to the convening of a world disarmament conference. As Sir Harold Beeley pointed out in our explanation of vote on the subject in the First Committee of the General Assembly:

"In our view, the proposed conference is a device for arriving at one objective, and an important one: the association with disarmament negotiations of States which are not Members of the United Nations, and in particular those non-Members which are important military Powers. By reason of their participation, a world conference would have opportunities which are not open to the bodies in which disarmament discussions are at present conducted -- the United Nations itself and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. As I have said, this is a valid reason for moving towards a world conference. But it is also, in the view of my delegation, the only reason for so doing." (A/C.1/PV.1377, p.8)

My Government's view is that the convening of a world disarmament conference is primarily a matter for its sponsors. We wish them well in their difficult and complex task.

I should also like to recall in this context two points made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles:

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"(1) That the resolution we adopt cannot in any way infringe on the primary responsibility of the United Nations in the solution of the disarmament problem, a responsibility to which express reference is made in the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution;

"(2) That the world disarmament conference should not adversely affect, but on the contrary should promote, the functions entrusted to the organs of the United Nations which are concerned with disarmament, especially the Eighteen-Nation Committee". (A/C.1/PV.1379, p.33-35)

Before I come to the end of my brief remarks today, I should like to quote some words spoken by the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York last year. Ambassador El-Kony said:

"Disarmament is not something that can be achieved by waving a magic wand; it will involve prolonged and at times frustrating periods of negotiation." (DC/PV.71, p.12)

This is a view to which I subscribe whole-heartedly and without reservation. And I should like to emphasize especially the last word of that quotation, the word "negotiation". I should like to ask everyone around this table whether, if we follow the pattern of the last and earlier sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the leisurely pattern of addressing long-range speeches at each other twice a week, we are really engaging in a process of negotiation.

This to me is not only a matter of getting our work done more quickly -- although this in itself is crucial enough when one considers the nature of the problems we are trying to solve --; it is also an important matter of psychology. Much of the success or failure of disarmament negotiations will depend in the long run upon the sincerity and passion with which the people of the world desire and demand peace and the international rule of law. They are not likely to be seized with the terrible urgency of this problem so long as we, who are charged with solving it, conduct our affairs in a way that seems to them to be too relaxed and leisurely. I realize that some of the comments that have been made about our deliberations here are ill-informed and irresponsible; but, if we are in fact to come to grips with the problems which face us, we must, I believe, improve our methods of work and inject a greater sense of urgency into our deliberations.

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I should like, first of all, to suggest formally that we examine the possibility of holding more than our customary two meetings a week. I understand that, although there might be administrative difficulties, they could be readily overcome. Against my proposal it is often argued that there is no point in meeting if no one is prepared to speak. This might be a valid argument if we were simply planning to make, and listen to, an endless series of formal and prepared speeches. But we now have a treaty to negotiate -- clause by clause and article by article -- and we shall negotiate it sooner if we are prepared to meet more often.

Then there is a second point. There would, I think, be advantage to us all in inviting the co-Chairmen jointly or alternately to give the Committee periodic reports on what progress has, in their view, been made in the Committee and in private talks and in what areas progress seems likely to be made in the future. This is not to suggest that every informal meeting that takes place, here or anywhere else, on disarmament matters should of necessity be the subject of a separate report to this Committee. Nor should I expect the co-Chairmen to change the present system by which they are able to have informal exchanges of views without making their conversations a matter for general debate. But I believe that our work would be better concentrated and more profitably directed if the co-Chairmen were invited to report from time to time and give us some guidelines for future progress.

I also firmly believe that our discussions, particularly those on general and complete disarmament, could well have a more technical content. Representatives who were here at the time will no doubt recall what Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, said on 23 June 1964:

"It is absolutely necessary for us -- especially those of us virtually untutored in nuclear weapons, their characteristics, and the relative ease or otherwise of their reduction and elimination -- to know all that there is to know so that we can properly evaluate the various proposals before us."

(ENDC/PV.192, p.18)

I support the Nigerian representative in this, and add that the only way in which we shall develop a hard core of informed technical opinion on any of the main aspects of arms control and disarmament is by arranging technical discussions with experts from all sides. This will not only be of value to those non-nuclear and non-aligned countries like Nigeria, but it should also help to create a better understanding between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers of the reasoning that lies behind the

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various proposals of each side. It is no use saying that technical discussions are no good because the decisions that face us are political. As I have said before in this Committee, no responsible country in the nuclear age can take political decisions of this importance without first weighing all the scientific evidence that is available.

Finally, may I have a brief word on general and complete disarmament? For reasons which I need not elaborate, this Committee has not engaged in discussions on general and complete disarmament for over eighteen months. This gap is regrettable, and I was very happy to note that the co-Chairmen's recommendation (ENDC/PV.235, p.11) that we should include general and complete disarmament in our discussions this session was accepted without dissent. But I hope that they will be useful discussions and that we shall not drop into the well-worn grooves of the past. The subjects, of course, remain the same. It is our approach to them which must change. My delegation is **prepared** to engage in full and detailed discussions of whatever aspects of general and complete disarmament the Committee may decide should be given preference. In the past much has been said about reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles, and it may be that we should devote more effort to this particular aspect as the key to progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

So far the climate of this session of the Committee has been one of calm and quiet appraisal. I hope that it will remain so. I believe that we can advance a little this year along more than one of the roads that lead to disarmament; and I believe that the one that seems most promising is that of a non-proliferation treaty. I think that if my colleagues will examine carefully the two draft treaties on this subject -- and I am sure they have already done that -- the area of common interest will be seen to be wider than the area of conflict. I shall hope to go more closely into this when we begin the meetings specifically devoted to non-proliferation. Then I shall hope to make it clear that, so far as my Government is concerned, we have no plans, no projects, no intentions that need stand in the way of an effective agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have asked to speak in order to inform the Committee of a message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The text of the message is as follows:

"On behalf of the Soviet Government, I convey our greetings and wishes for success to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the occasion of the resumption of its work.

"More than forty years ago, on the initiative of V.I. Lenin, the Soviet Union set as a pressing international aim the accomplishment of universal disarmament in order to ensure peace and friendship among nations. True to Lenin's precepts, the Soviet Government has submitted for the Committee's consideration a specific programme for general and complete disarmament, which provides for the complete elimination of armaments and armed forces. It was due to the initiative of the Soviet Union that the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution on an economic disarmament programme which would make it possible to increase the well-being of all the peoples of the world within a short period of history and would enable countries and peoples which are lagging behind as a result of colonialism to overcome their economic backwardness and to attain the level of modern civilization. That wide disarmament programme is still our programme today and we are sure that, in the struggle against the forces of militarism and aggression, it will become the banner of an ever-increasing number of people who really cherish peace and progress.

"Unfortunately, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not succeeded in achieving any serious results during the period of its existence. The States members of the NATO military-political bloc which are taking part in the Committee's work have not given the Committee a chance to make any progress. However, this should not deprive the States which really want disarmament of their determination to achieve this aim and to continue their struggle both for general and complete disarmament and for the implementation of collateral measures which would clear the way to disarmament.

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"The Soviet Government would like once again to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the severe ordeals which the world is undergoing at the present time. For a long time now, the flames of war having been raging in Viet-Nam, whose freedom-loving people have become the victims of imperialistic intervention which is also threatening the adjacent countries. The aggression in Viet-Nam is an aggression against all countries and peoples that are defending their freedom and independence and their sovereign right to build their lives according to their own wishes, without any outside interference whatsoever.

"The ideas of peace and disarmament are incompatible with a policy of armed interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples. Militarism turns to destructive purposes what might be used for the advancement of mankind and destroys the results of the labour of millions of people.

"The Soviet Union, consistently pursuing a policy aimed at consolidating peace and achieving disarmament, has on this occasion also come to the Eighteen-Nation Committee with a specific programme of measures designed to free present and future generations from the burden of armaments.

"In the forefront of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at present is the task of accomplishing a series of measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

"The Soviet Government insists on the need for the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unless an end is put to the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war will increase many times over. Yet there are plans for such a proliferation, although they are camouflaged by professions of peaceful intentions. These plans provide for giving access to nuclear bombs to the militarists and revanchists of the Federal Republic of Germany, which openly sets as the main object of its policy the revision of the existing European frontiers and the annexation of the territory of other countries. The peoples, especially the peoples of Europe, are too well aware of the adventurist nature of the German militarists to reconcile themselves to these dangerous plans.

"The draft agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union has submitted to the Committee is permeated with a single aim, namely, to block all paths to the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is fully in keeping with the resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and which expressed the will of the peoples. In order to

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facilitate agreement on the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet Government declares its willingness to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory.

"The Soviet Government fully supports the proposal of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1) to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and to freeze nuclear armaments in that area, as well as proposals to establish denuclearized zones in other parts of the world. It is prepared to assume an obligation to respect the status of any denuclearized zones which may be established provided that other nuclear Powers assume similar obligations.

"Three years will soon have passed since the conclusion of the international Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The Soviet Government declares its willingness to reach agreement immediately on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests as well, on the basis of the use of national systems of detection for control over such prohibition.

"The time has also come to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted such a resolution several years ago, (A/RES/1653(XVI)) when it condemned the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity and called for the conclusion of a special convention. The Soviet Union is prepared to assume immediately an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, provided that the other nuclear Powers do likewise.

"The present world situation also urgently calls for solution of the problem of the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The events which are now taking place in the world convincingly show that foreign military bases and armed forces in the territories of other countries represent a serious threat to world peace. These bases, which as a rule comprise nuclear weapons, greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The establishment of these bases and the stationing of foreign troops in the territories of other countries are indissolubly linked with the preparation and carrying out of military adventures, with the suppression of national liberation movements and with attempts to stifle the freedom and independence of nations. The Soviet Union is of the opinion that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider the question of the complete elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, so as to rid the world of these dangerous hotbeds of war, colonialism and aggression.

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"In order really to put an end to the danger of a nuclear war and to the nuclear armaments race, the Soviet Government proposes that the nuclear Powers should consider the question of carrying out immediately the programme relating to nuclear disarmament. Such disarmament must provide for the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons accumulated by States, the prohibition of their manufacture, the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their production, and the elimination of military bases in foreign territories. (ENDC/123). Only such measures, not the elimination of only a few atomic and hydrogen bombs from the vast stockpiles accumulated by States, can free the peoples from the threat of a nuclear war.

"We must bear in mind the fact that the high-sounding phrases about disarmament uttered by certain governments are scarcely, if at all, compatible with the policy which they are actually carrying out. These governments speak of disarmament and at the same time are increasing their military budgets, fostering war psychosis and creating ever greater international tension in the world situation. The Soviet Government considers that one of the most important tasks of the Disarmament Committee should be to work out effective measures which would lead to the reduction of the military budgets of States and, in conjunction with other similar measures, would help to normalize relations between nations.

"In submitting for the Committee's consideration these constructive and thoroughly well-pondered proposals, the Soviet Government bases itself on the assumption that they could serve as a basis for further progress along the path towards disarmament.

"The Soviet Union, like other peace-loving countries, is fully determined to continue the struggle against aggression and for the strengthening of peace, national freedom and independence and the peaceful co-existence of States, irrespective of their social systems. On this basis, we shall take an active part in the work of the Disarmament Committee. Our representatives have been instructed to defend the position of the Soviet Union firmly and to explain it patiently. At the same time, they will be prepared to study and to take into consideration without prejudice the proposals of any other delegation, if these proposals are really aimed at furthering the case of disarmament.

"Through joint efforts, the nations can and must succeed in putting an end to aggression, relaxing international tension, and solving the problems of disarmament.

(Signed) A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1 February 1966".

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That is the end of the message. I request the Secretariat to issue the message as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.^{1/}

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for transmitting the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened with great attention to the message from the Soviet Government which has been read by the representative of the Soviet Union. We, like other delegations here, shall give it our very close attention with a view to commenting later upon some of the propositions put forward in it.

Before beginning the main part of my statement I should like to echo, on behalf of the Canadian delegation, the condolences which have already been expressed to the Indian and Nigerian delegations on the recent tragic and deplorable deaths of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Bewawa and Dr. Homi Bhabha.

At the same time, I have the more pleasant task of joining in the welcome which has been extended to the new representatives of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere; of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf; and of Ethiopia, Ambassador Abera. It is also, of course, a great pleasure to have with us once more the representative of Poland, Ambassador Blusztajn.

The twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations has given certain tasks to this Committee. We all know what they are, but to indicate the general outline of what I have to say this morning I shall repeat three of the key clauses from the several resolutions dealing with disarmament which the Assembly adopted.

We are called upon to ---

"... give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ... with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons" (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161), paying attention to certain principles which the resolution goes on to enumerate.

We are also called upon to ---

"... continue with a sense of urgency (our) work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection ...". (A/RES/2032 (XX); ibid.)

We are also requested to continue our --

"... efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures". (A/RES/2031 (XX)); (ibid.)

The other two resolutions dealing with disarmament -- on the holding of a world disarmament conference (A/RES/2030 (XX); ENDC/162), and on the denuclearization of Africa (A/RES/2033 (XX); ibid.) -- important as they are, do not contain any request or call for action by this Committee.

There we have our tasks set out; and I think members will all agree that if we are to fulfil them, or even only part of them, we shall have a full agenda until the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

How are we to set about these tasks? We are unfortunately well acquainted with the obstacles to progress in the three spheres of disarmament to which we have been called upon to address ourselves in particular. We have been given a general indication of how we should divide our time in the early part of our session in dealing with the agenda which has been recommended by the co-Chairmen and approved by the Committee at our opening meeting (ENDC/PV.235, p.11).

The first subject we are to deal with -- by general consent the most urgent -- is non-proliferation, on which we have been trying to negotiate an international treaty. We have the draft introduced in this Committee on 17 August 1965 by the United States and supported by the Western delegations (ENDC/152); and we have the draft introduced by the Soviet Union on 24 September 1965 in the General Assembly (ENDC/164). These two drafts, as we know, differ considerably both in substance and in language. We were very encouraged to hear from the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.235, p.20) that he is ready to enter into a thorough discussion of the treaty, article by article. And we were also encouraged to hear at the end of the message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is ready to negotiate and, in addition to defending its own views, to pay careful attention to any proposals made by other parties. All that, I repeat, is encouraging.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We know that the main sticking-point in the negotiations on non-proliferation so far has been the contention of the Soviet Union that certain proposals for the organization of a nuclear deterrent force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which some non-nuclear nations of this alliance would participate, would constitute proliferation. However, I would point out that no such force has been organized or even agreed upon. In this connexion one is perhaps reminded of the saying of Mark Twain, that he was an old man who had had a great many troubles in his life, most of which had never happened. The problem before us, as the Canadian delegation sees it, is to find a way to express agreement, in treaty language, that nothing shall be done which may constitute proliferation, whether by organizing combined nuclear deterrent forces in any group of States, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or otherwise. The problem really relates to associations or groups of States. I think the problem of finding language which can be agreed upon to prohibit proliferation in the case of a single State is not so difficult; the difficulty we face is to come to an understanding of what we mean by "proliferation" when an association of States is in question.

The Canadian delegation was impressed by the remarks of the representative of Nigeria on this subject at our meeting of 27 January, and in particular his observation that --

"... it would be wrong to approach the problem of non-proliferation from the sole angle of preoccupation with the maintenance or otherwise of the status quo in Central Europe, as has been the case so far and still appears to be the case from what we heard this afternoon. A universal approach to the problem is not only essential but desirable and inescapable."

(ENDC/PV.235, p.30)

We believe that what the representative of Nigeria said is very true. It is indeed essential to bear in mind that the question of non-proliferation interests States in all parts of the world and will be satisfactorily resolved only if their views are taken into account. In one of the forthcoming meetings in which we shall be dealing with the particular subject of non-proliferation, we expect to have occasion to quote more of the points which Mr. Obi made in the part of his statement which dealt with that subject.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We were especially interested, in listening to the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, to hear the part in which he declared his Government's willingness to include in the draft treaty an article dealing with the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. This proposal will be studied by the Canadian Government, which will express its views on it in due course.

How shall we proceed in this negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty? Undoubtedly most representatives here will wish to make general statements on the question; but, in the view of my delegation, it is not too soon for the Committee to begin to think of what would be the best method of engaging in the detailed article-by-article discussion with a view to reaching agreement on a specific text -- the kind of discussion which we all agree is necessary and which you, Mr. Chairman, referred to this morning.

In this connexion we welcome the suggestion which was put forward at the last meeting by the representative of Italy. He proposed that --

"...as soon as the general debate is concluded, the Conference should set up a drafting committee on which all its members would be represented and which would examine side by side the two draft treaties ..." (ENDC/PV.236, p.8).

I should like to recall to the members of the Committee -- at any rate to those who were here in 1962 -- that at that time we did work out a flexible way of drafting the preamble to the treaty on general and complete disarmament and other texts through this process of taking into account the views and suggestions of all members. That involved holding a certain number of meetings of what, at that time, we called the "Committee of the Whole"; that is to say, less formal meetings than the plenary meetings, meetings at which everyone was present but at which written records were not kept. At those meetings representatives did not read out prepared statements but made direct comments to each other and explained their views on the various articles which were being considered for adoption in the document.

Before leaving the subject of non-proliferation, I should like to endorse another observation made by the representative of Nigeria in the statement from which I have already quoted. He said:

"... the sort of non-proliferation measure and concerted action which I have just outlined above should not be left to stand on its own for too long." (ENDC/PV.235, p.32)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Mr. Obi then went on to cite other measures of disarmament, and for keeping the peace, which his delegation considered should follow and support a non-proliferation agreement. The first among these was a comprehensive test ban and a cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments. To develop a treaty to effect this was the second of the tasks given to us by the twentieth session of the General Assembly, as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks.

The Canadian delegation agrees with the view that a comprehensive test ban is one of the most important measures for dealing with the nuclear threat. It would, along with a non-proliferation agreement, bar the development of nuclear weapons by States not now possessing them, and it would have as well an inhibiting effect on the nuclear arms race among nuclear States.

On this question, again, we are only too familiar with the barrier to agreement. The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom all say that they want to make the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) complete; but they take different positions on what would be necessary to verify that all parties to a treaty to stop underground testing were respecting their obligations. The Soviet Union claims that all underground tests can be detected by nationally-operated means situated within the national boundaries. The United States and the United Kingdom, supported by their partners, claim that there will be a residue of events, detectable by seismological means, which it will be impossible to identify by these means either as earthquakes or as underground nuclear tests.

Here we seem to be faced with a question of fact -- although I think you will agree, Mr. Chairman, that it is not at all a question of simple fact. It does seem to be a question which would be susceptible of being answered by scientific study and analysis. The answer is not likely to be that position A is right and position B is wrong. It will be an approximate answer, something in the form of "It would seem to be probable that such and such a percentage of underground events whose effects would correspond to explosions of such and such kilotonnage will be detected and identified."

The Canadian delegation regrets that so far the Soviet Union has not agreed to have a meeting between the scientists of the two sides who deal with this matter, either in a sub-committee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee or in some other forum. We think that a discussion between the scientists who are fully aware

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

of the potentialities of their national means of detection and identification could provide an answer to the question of fact which I have tried to describe. We think also that it is very important that the scientists of those non-aligned and non-nuclear countries which have effective organizations for recording seismic data should be included in these discussions. We hope that the Soviet Union will change its position on this question of a scientific discussion of the facts of detection and identification.

Another approach to the solution of the problem of fact relating to an agreement on how a ban on underground testing is to be verified is that which has been suggested by Sweden both here (ENDC/154), and in the United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1385, p.6). Canada strongly supports the Swedish idea of a nuclear detection club for this purpose. There are many States -- prospective adherents to a comprehensive test ban -- which, although they do not have detailed, scientific knowledge of this subject, could find their interests seriously affected by a breach of a comprehensive test ban. These States would have as much right as any others to assurance that the treaty was being adhered to. One of the reasons why the Swedish idea appeals to us is that it would go some way toward meeting this very real need. We are willing to join an organization such as Sweden proposes, and feel that Canada would have something useful to contribute to it. We hope that our Swedish friends will be able to make effective progress towards the formation of the club in the near future. We shall have more to say about this approach at a meeting devoted to underground test prohibition.

This brings me to general and complete disarmament. We know that in previous sessions when we were dealing with this matter, which has always been regarded as the principal task of this Committee, we came to an impasse because we could reach no agreement on the crucial question of how nuclear weapon vehicles were to be reduced and finally eliminated. The positions of the two sides are familiar to everyone here: both are agreed that nuclear weapon vehicles are the sector of the apparatus of nuclear warfare whose reduction and final elimination should be concentrated upon. But the difference between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries here relates to how quickly reductions can be made and how they are to be verified; how they can be applied without upsetting the principle agreed upon, that no measure of

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

disarmament should create an advantage for any State or group of States -- the principle that is generally referred to as the "principle of balance".

In passing, I should like to remark that this so-called principle of balance, one of those contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), is not -- and I repeat: not -- the same thing as the balance of power, which is a political conception of the past, under which alliances between nations were contracted with the intention of offsetting a supposed military superiority of some particular nation which it was thought might otherwise set up a hegemony in Europe. Unfortunately, in some of the statements made here the two notions have been confused: the principle of balance, or that no measure of disarmament should create an advantage for any State or group of States -- which was agreed upon and endorsed by the General Assembly -- and the old and rather discredited idea of a balance of power.

I shall not take much of the Committee's time this morning in discussing how we might get on with the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, I shall say that the Canadian delegation believes that the way to begin the reduction of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles is offered by the proposals which the representative of the United States has placed before the Committee. These proposals were contained in the message of 21 January 1964 from President Johnson (ENDC/120). I refer particularly to the proposal relating to the reduction of stockpiles of fissionable material and of nuclear weapons, and the proposal for a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons and a subsequent reduction in the number of these delivery vehicles.

In spite of that part of the message which we have received from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union that seemed to decry any such measures preliminary to general and complete disarmament, we think the problem is one of how to begin. We have not been able to solve it before, nor have we been able to accept any idea that in a flash, or in the relatively short time of eighteen months, all these weapons and all danger of a nuclear war could disappear.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation has said before -- and it continues to believe -- that in the proposals contained in President Johnson's letter there is an opening for the reduction of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles. That is the point, as I have said, at which our negotiations on a treaty for general and complete disarmament reached a standstill. A mutual freeze and mutual reductions could be negotiated, it seems to us, in a way which would not give a military advantage to any group of States, and could be verified in a way which would not threaten the military security of any State.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that we are all in your debt for the constructive statement you made this morning and for the sense of urgency which was reflected in your remarks. The procedural suggestions you put forward for improving and accelerating the work of the Committee do commend themselves to my delegation, which hopes that they will also commend themselves to the other members of the Committee.

In conclusion, I should like to say again that the Canadian delegation is encouraged by the message sent by Chairman Kosygin (ENDC/167), expressing once more the concern of the Soviet Union that progress should be made in disarmament. This message follows those of His Holiness the Pope (ENDC/163), of President Johnson (ENDC/165) and of Prime Minister Wilson (ENDC/166). The concern expressed by these men in posts of the highest responsibility in the world should stimulate all members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to renew their efforts to find a way past, over or around the obstacles which, regrettably, have frustrated past sessions of the Committee.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): We have just heard the important message that has been sent to our Committee by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin. The Polish delegation will study this message very carefully, and it hopes that the Committee will have an opportunity very soon to examine these important proposals carefully, in a constructive spirit.

Before I begin my statement I should like to join those of my colleagues who have already presented condolences to the delegations of India and Nigeria on the tragic deaths of Prime Minister Shastri, Professor Bhabha and Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I should also like to extend a word of welcome to the new representatives, Ambassador Ijewere of Nigeria, Ambassador Aberra of Ethiopia, and Ambassador Khallaf of the United Arab Republic.

I believe that while we are meeting again in Geneva for another round of disarmament negotiations it is only proper that we should try to assess the present position and formulate guide lines for our future action. Since we adjourned last September, the General Assembly of the United Nations has had the opportunity to review the whole situation and to adopt a series of recommendations which have a direct bearing on our work. May I recall that the Assembly reaffirmed its interest in the question of general and complete disarmament (A/RES/2031(XX); ENDC/161) and requested us to continue our efforts toward making substantial progress in reaching agreement on this question, as well as agreements on collateral measures?

The General Assembly furthermore endorsed the view that all countries should contribute toward the accomplishment of disarmament, and gave its overwhelming support to the idea of convening a world disarmament conference not later than 1967 (A/RES/2030(XX); ENDC/162). The General Assembly marked its support for the concept of nuclear-free zones by endorsing (A/RES/2033(XX); ibid.) the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the Heads of State and Government of African countries (ENDC/93/Rev.1). It also gave expression to the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/RES/2032(XX); ENDC/161). Lastly, it adopted an important resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028(XX); ibid.). Our Committee is called upon to give urgent consideration to this question with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thus our mandate is clear. We must continue our efforts to explore all possibilities of making progress towards an agreement on general and complete disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal. At the same time we are urged to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The priorities are clearly laid down. They are confirmed by the recommendations of our co-Chairmen as to our order of business, which we accepted at our first meeting, a week ago (ENDC/PV.235, p.11).

My delegation intends therefore to address its preliminary remarks today mainly to the problem of non-proliferation. This will not be a general statement, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will not therefore rule me out of order.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

It seems to us that the importance of the resolution which the General Assembly accepted on this subject resides in the fact that for the first time a set of guiding principles is laid down upon which a treaty on non-proliferation should be based. I should like to refer particularly to the first principle, which states that --

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form". (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161).

May I draw attention to the specific language of this principle? It speaks about "any loop-holes" which might permit proliferation in any form. The intention of the General Assembly was clearly to lay down objective criteria, leaving no room for arbitrary interpretation.

The need for closing all possible ways of access to nuclear weapons is dictated by the present international situation and by the present state of the nuclear armaments race. For it is obvious that in the circumstances prevailing in the world the existence of any possibility which might permit any State to gain ownership, possession or disposition of atomic weapons in any form, directly or indirectly, through a military alliance or otherwise, must not only lead inevitably to the proliferation of such arms but also, by affecting the general equilibrium, stimulate the atomic armaments race.

This thought was stressed by many speakers during the debates in the First Committee of the General Assembly. The representative of the United Arab Republic expressed it in the following terms:

"... any international agreement, while preserving the nuclear status quo as it exists in the world at present, should not permit in any form whatsoever a changing of the nuclear balance; rather we expect that agreement to diminish all incentives, legitimate or otherwise, to increase the number of potential nuclear Powers". (A/C.I/PV.1359, p.26)

In the view of the Polish delegation, our main preoccupation should be the drafting of a treaty on non-proliferation "void of any loop-holes". It is in the light of this principle that we should like to examine the two draft treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which are before us (ENDC/152, 164).

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Let us consider first the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union. As may be seen, it not only provides for a prohibition on transferring such weapons in any form to the ownership or control of non-nuclear States or groups of States, but also prohibits the granting to such States of the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union draft treaty goes even further. It extends the prohibition to --

"... units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance" (ENDC/164, p.4).

The draft treaty submitted by the delegation of the United States cannot be considered to be in conformity with the principles laid down by the General Assembly resolution. It is not a draft void of any loop-holes. It is limited in scope. It prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons only to the national control of non-nuclear States. It is concerned only with preventing other non-nuclear States from gaining independent power to use nuclear weapons.

However, when one compares the United States draft treaty with the contents of the message from President Johnson to our Conference (ENDC/165), read to us by Ambassador Foster a week ago, certain differences appear. The message, while maintaining the previous criterion of national control, widens somewhat the interpretation of the concept of indirect transfer through the inclusion of third countries or groups of countries and units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance.

Furthermore, Ambassador Foster, while introducing the message of President Johnson, repeated that arrangements for NATO nuclear defence would contribute neither to transferring atomic weapons to the national control of non-nuclear States, nor to increasing the total number of States and organizations having independent power to use such nuclear weapons. But he added that "there would be no increase, even by one, in the centres of nuclear power". (ENDC/PV.235, p.27)

We think that all this calls for certain clarifications. First, we should like to know whether the formula contained in President Johnson's message supersedes the formula of article I, paragraph 1 of the United States draft treaty of 17 August 1965.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Secondly, it seems to us that, before proceeding further, the Committee ought to be enlightened on the exact implications of President Johnson's formula that the treaty will bar the transfer of atomic weapons "through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance" (ENDC/165), in the light of the proposed nuclear arrangements within the framework of NATO. Thirdly, we think that an additional explanation is needed as to the precise meaning of these words: "there would be no increase, even by one, in the centres of nuclear power".

In limiting the scope of a treaty on non-proliferation to a prohibition of transfer of nuclear weapons to the national control of non-nuclear States, as provided for in the draft submitted by the United States delegation, we would in fact encourage proliferation by other means. It is impossible to escape the impression -- and Ambassador Cavalletti's statement of last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.236) only confirmed our conviction -- that the Western Powers view a non-proliferation treaty as an element of their NATO policy, and as being subject to the present needs of the alliance.

The representatives of the United States and Italy have praised the guarantees the United States draft treaty is supposed to offer, but at the same time they ask us to accept an instrument which would not interfere with the proposed nuclear arrangements under NATO, arrangements which would in fact alter the present situation in the field of atomic weapons by giving non-nuclear States specific rights in this respect.

The Polish delegation considers that any disarmament measure must be based on respect for the security interests of all States. It would be very unwise to assume that a non-proliferation treaty could be negotiated on terms which would leave the door open for new "nuclear arrangements" under NATO.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I think that at this juncture I owe a few words of explanation to the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi. He said in his statement last Thursday that it seems to him that --

"... the present nuclear and super-Powers conceive of the non-proliferation problem in a somewhat myopic fashion. Their approach is somewhat lopsided and their preoccupation seems ... to be with certain countries in Central Europe." (ENDC/PV.235, p.30)

Mr. Obi considers that --

"... it would be wrong to approach the problem of non-proliferation from the sole angle of preoccupation with the maintenance ... of the status quo in Central Europe ... A universal approach to the problem is not only essential but desirable and inescapable." (ibid.)

May I say to Mr. Obi that, although we are neither a nuclear Power nor a super-Power, we share these preoccupations, precisely because we believe that a universal approach to the non-proliferation problem is so essential. We attach so much weight to these problems because we are convinced that in our times peace is indivisible, that the struggle for peace must be waged on all fronts but particularly where the potential dangers to world peace are the greatest. We are so concerned with the situation in Central Europe because there runs the dividing line between two most powerful military alliances, because there political forces are in action which are committed to the alteration of the existing international order and which to this end are trying at all costs to gain access to nuclear weapons.

Our preoccupation with Central Europe is so great because we are convinced that the acceptance of the extravagant demands of the Federal Republic of Germany will jeopardize the chances for a world-wide agreement on non-proliferation. I hope that Mr. Obi will understand my point of view, that he will agree with me that our criticism of the so-called NATO nuclear arrangements reflects only our conviction that such arrangements must inevitably have world-wide implications going far beyond the European scene.

Both Mr. Foster and Mr. Cavalletti presented here the customary defence of the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Their main contention was that the Federal Republic has entered into a commitment not to manufacture nuclear weapons. This calls for certain remarks on our part. I make them, not to score debating points, but to set the record straight.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

There is enough evidence to indicate that this commitment is not unconditional. From the circumstances in which the Paris Treaty was concluded in 1954 it appears that the renunciation by the Federal Republic of the manufacture of nuclear weapons was made subject to overall political considerations. Such, at least, is the view of the former West German Defence Minister, Mr. Strauss, who in his article published last year in the review International Affairs under the title "An Alliance of Continents" (vol. 41, April 1965, p.200), refers to the assurances given by Mr. John Foster Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer that the West German undertaking not to produce nuclear weapons was subject to the rebus sic stantibus clause. Furthermore, several statements made lately by various West German statesmen indicate that in their view the problem of West Germany's nuclear rearmament remains open.

Whatever the representatives of the Western Powers in our Committee may say, the truth is that, unlike many States which possess the capability of undertaking the production of nuclear weapons but do not want to do so, although not bound by any legal commitment, the Federal Republic of Germany, which is formally committed not to produce nuclear weapons, is doing everything in its power to safeguard its freedom of action, meanwhile exerting its influence to gain access to nuclear weapons by indirect means. I leave it to representatives here to judge the validity of Mr. Foster's statement that the Federal Republic of Germany "has already made an important contribution towards the objective of non-proliferation". (ENDC/PV.235, p.26) I am afraid that further "contributions" of that nature may nullify all our efforts to bring about a treaty on non-proliferation.

I had intended to conclude my statement with those remarks. I feel compelled to continue, however, because certain events which have occurred during the last few days in South-East Asia have a direct bearing on our deliberations and cannot be left without comment. I refer, of course, to the resumption of bombings by the United States Air Force of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. May I say that, although we were not surprised by the renewal of the air raids, one could not help feeling a sentiment of disappointment at the fact that in Washington reason has failed to prevail over bad judgement, that restraint has been thrown away in favour of a display of crude and destructive force.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The resumption of the air raids over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam cannot be considered as an act of sane and rational policy. Their ineffectiveness as an instrument designed to achieve political or military ends was plainly demonstrated during the months of last year. They can be explained only as a desperate move designed to support a bankrupt policy by spreading destruction.

This is the finale of President Johnson's so well publicized peace offensive. The bombs that were dropped over North Viet-Nam on Monday have furnished additional and conclusive proof that the call for unconditional negotiations was in fact an attempt to impose negotiations on conditions laid down by the United States Government.

The United States Government claims that it is committed to seeking a negotiated solution to the Viet-Nam problem; but its deeds speak stronger than its words. A negotiated settlement will not be promoted by the continuing violation of all fundamental principles of international law. Peace will not be achieved through the continuing aggression against the sovereign State of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam will not be secured by the armed intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of that country, by the persistent refusal of the United States to recognize those who, by their heroic struggle for the liberty and independence of their country and by resisting foreign armed intervention, have gained the right to speak for the South Viet-Nameese people.

There is only one way out: a solution can be found and worked out on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The aggressive acts against North Viet-Nam must stop. The United States army must leave South Viet-Nam. The South Viet-Nameese people must be given the opportunity to decide its own future, without outside interference.

We have taken the Committee's time in making this statement because we are aware of the impact of the situation in Viet-Nam on our negotiations. We are here to fulfil a mandate we have received from the United Nations. We are here to secure peace through disarmament. But while we are discussing different schemes which may bring us closer to our ultimate goal, it is, I submit, the duty of all Governments represented here to refrain from actions which might jeopardize the peace of the world and make our work here pointless.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): I should like to make a few remarks on the very interesting statements that we have heard this morning. Before doing so, however, I wish to express my appreciation for the warm welcome which has been extended to me by many members of the Committee.

My delegation has listened with very close interest to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, and, in particular, to the message of Prime Minister Kosygin. My delegation will, of course, give the most interesting points raised in the message close study and will comment on them in due course, as appropriate.

We cannot, however, refrain from commenting now, at least in a preliminary manner, on that section of the message which indicates that the Soviet Union is prepared to write into the treaty an article on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory.

Members of the Committee will recall that during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly -- on 15 October 1965 to be precise -- and a week ago in this hall, the Nigerian delegation declared:

"There is, so far, no guarantee that the massive nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers would not be used against non-nuclear States or that the latter would not be the victims of nuclear blackmail. An indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is, therefore, a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers under any circumstances whatsoever, or to threaten to use them. So long as non-nuclear States have the possibility of having nuclear weapons used against them, so long as this fear hangs over them as a sword of Damocles, so long as they are threatened with nuclear weapons or subjected to nuclear blackmail, then so long will pressures build up in the countries of non-nuclear Powers to acquire nuclear weapons; pressures which even the most responsible and peace-loving governments would find difficult to resist for very long."

(A/C.1/PV. 1356, pp.27, 28-30; ENDC/PV. 235, pp. 31, 32)

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

This thesis received very wide support from Members of the United Nations, some of which, like Brazil, are members of this Committee. We sought, therefore, to have this included in the draft resolution on non-proliferation, but met resistance from the great Powers. As we declared in New York:

"My delegation was immensely gratified to note, not only that the rational basis and validity of these theses was universally recognized, but also that many delegations, especially those of non-nuclear countries, expressed their support for it. We had a thought that a proposal which enjoys such wide support would be able to find a place in the resolution which has just been adopted, one aim of which is to provide useful guide lines for the negotiations on the question of non-proliferation in Geneva.

"We suggested its inclusion in the draft resolution. To our surprise and disappointment, however, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seemed prepared to accept the suggestion. As we pointed out in our statement of 19 October, it is to the national self-interest of the present nuclear Powers not to give nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers and not to encourage the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any way. That interest can hardly be said completely to coincide with that of non-nuclear Powers faced with a feeling of insecurity arising from the possibility of nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

"We have submitted in the past, and we still maintain, that the attitude of the nuclear Powers in this regard is a most unrealistic one to adopt. If the nuclear Powers really desire agreement -- and we have no reason to believe that they do not -- they must be prepared to pay the price. The price which we are asking is, to say the least, reasonable."

Chief Adebo then asked:

"Is it too much for us, of the non-nuclear club, forswearing forever all rights of acquiring nuclear weapons, to ask the nuclear Powers to give us a firm undertaking not to use the nuclear weapons in their arsenals against a non-nuclear Power, and not to threaten us with them? We think not. It may be that a line will have to be drawn between the security requirements of those non-nuclear Powers which are members of alliances which include nuclear Powers, and those of non-nuclear Powers which are not.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

"We take some comfort in the thought that operative paragraph 2 B of this resolution will enable us to pursue this question in Geneva. We should have preferred the paragraph to be more explicitly framed for this purpose, but we refrained from pressing our point further than we did because we do not want unduly to prolong the work of the Committee or to make a consensus more difficult to achieve. We trust that in a more detailed consideration of the problem in Geneva the views of the vast majority of the non-nuclear world as expressed in this Committee will meet with a more favourable and sympathetic reception from the nuclear Powers." (A/C.1/PV.1373, pp. 47, 48-50)

My delegation is accordingly very interested in this new Soviet proposal, which we welcome. We are also convinced that the proposal, if acceptable to the other nuclear Powers, would go a long way towards facilitating the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty which would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Nigerian delegation has listened with very great interest to the statement which you, Mr. Chairman, made this morning. We have listened with equal interest to the statements made by the representatives of Canada and Poland. We shall give all those statements careful study and in due course shall comment upon them.

I shall, however, refer now to that part of your statement, Mr. Chairman, in which you said:

"There would, I think, be advantage to us all in inviting the co-Chairmen jointly or alternately to give the Committee periodic reports on what progress has, in their view, been made in the Committee and in private talks, and in what areas progress seems likely to be made in the future. This is not to suggest that every informal meeting that takes place, here or anywhere else, on disarmament matters should of necessity be the subject of a separate report to this Committee. Nor should I expect the co-Chairmen to change the present system by which they are able to have informal exchanges of views without making their conversations a matter for general debate. But I believe that our work would be better concentrated and more profitably directed if the co-Chairmen were invited to report from time to time and give us some guide lines for future progress." (supra, p.11)

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

As representatives are aware, my delegation is in favour of "big man talking to big man" (ENDC/PV.235, p.32), and we, the small, shall welcome the possibility of knowing what they talk about and what progress they make. We therefore support the proposal which you, Mr. Chairman, made in this connexion, on the condition that it is acceptable to the co-Chairmen. We should not like to cause them any embarrassment.

It will be observed that I have refrained from taking issue with Mr. Blusztajn, the representative of Poland. That is because we should like first to read his statement in the verbatim record. Listening to him, however, I do not see that we are very much in disagreement. We still feel that the problems of Central Europe are inextricably linked with our exercise on disarmament; but we submit that the problem of non-proliferation should not be approached solely from that preoccupation. We are happy to note that Mr. Burns of Canada agrees with us on this, and we are sure that our Polish colleague will do likewise when he reads our statement as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I now call on the representative of the United States, in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Before exercising my right of reply I should like to welcome two members who are with us today for the first time, the new representatives of Nigeria, Mr. Ijewere, and Ethiopia, Mr. Aberra.

I regret the need to exercise my right of reply to the Polish representative, but Mr. Blusztajn's uninformed attack upon my Government's actions requires a brief response. He clearly has not read the recent statement of President Johnson, the statement of Secretary Rusk, or Ambassador Goldberg's statements yesterday and the day before in the Security Council. In addition, I made clear at the Committee's meeting of 27 January our position in Viet-Nam (ENDC/PV.235, pp. 25, 26). In Viet-Nam the United States is fighting to protect the right of a free people to remain free. We are not the aggressors. We are participating in collective defence against aggression from the North. That is why President Johnson took the action he took the other day. The thirty-seven-day suspension of bombing produced a wholly negative reply, the imposition of a new pre-condition to negotiations. At the same time, the suspension was exploited by the aggressors to improve supply lines and to bring more arms and men into the South. In those circumstances the aggressors invited the response they received.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

My Government is taxed by the representative of Poland with not seeking peace in Viet-Nam. It is not to my Government that he should address his remarks; it might be more helpful -- at least we would hope so -- for him to direct his remarks elsewhere and to try actively to turn towards a peaceful settlement those who still seek their ends by bloodshed and aggression.

I have purposely limited myself to those few brief remarks. Let me now turn to the business of this Committee. Let us hope that what our United Kingdom colleague, Lord Chalfont, has so aptly called the ritual attack on the West (ibid., p.43) does not become a continuing ritual, for that can only be disruptive of our work here.

May I say that we particularly welcome the interest shown by Mr. Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in the work of this Committee (ENDC/167)? This sort of intervention certainly contributes to the advancement of our work. We shall study his message with care, and we shall also study the comments made this morning by our Chairman of today, by our Canadian colleague, by the new Nigerian representative, and by the representative of Poland.

Mr. TELLO MACIAS (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I should like to suggest that the Committee should consider the possibility and advisability of combining the proposals submitted to it by the representatives of Italy (ENDC/PV.236, p.8) and the United Kingdom (supra, p.11). Since there seems to be a unanimous desire on the part of all those delegations which have so far taken part in the debate to give priority to the discussion and negotiation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Committee might agree when the time comes that the additional meeting suggested by the United Kingdom delegation should be a meeting of the drafting committee proposed by the Italian delegation.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 237th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Lord Chalfont, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the USSR, Canada, Poland, Nigeria, the United States of America and Mexico.

"The following documents were tabled:

Message dated 27 January 1966 from Prime Minister Wilson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/166).

Message dated 1 February 1966 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/167).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 8 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

